Attacks on improved key distribution protocols with perfect reparability by Raphael C.-W. Phan (7168670) & Bok-Min Goi (7209122)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
Attacks on Improved Key Distribution Protocols with 
Perfect Reparability 
 
Raphael C.-W. Phan1, Member, IEEE; and Bok-Min Goi2, Member, IEEE 
1Electronic & Electrical Engineering, Loughborough University, UK 
r.phan@lboro.ac.uk 
2Centre for Multimedia Security and Signal Processing,  
Cryptography & Information Security Research Group, 
Faculty of Engineering, Multimedia University, Malaysia 
bmgoi@mmu.edu.my 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we present attacks on two improved 
key distribution protocol with perfect reparability that 
were presented at ICON 2000.  First, we show that the 
two “attacks” described in their paper are trivial and 
do not count as attacks at all since they are well-known 
attacks that apply to any security system.  Further, we 
describe several attacks on both improved protocols, 
and show that an illegitimate attacker could easily 
impersonate legitimate parties and have other parties 
think they are sharing keys with the impersonated 
party when in fact that party is not present at all.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is often desirable within a distributed computing 
environment that users who wish to communicate with 
each other be able to do so securely over the network, 
despite the fact that the communication channel might 
be insecure or easily tapped into.  To achieve this, 
users typically make use of encryption [7, 9] to secure 
the information transmitted back and forth.  Note that 
encryption only provides confidentiality.  Integrity and 
authenticity employs other cryptographic primitives. 
Secret-key encryption schemes [7, 9] are preferred 
over their public-key encryption counterparts as they 
are faster and more efficient.  However, unlike the 
latter, secret-key encryption schemes require the same 
secret key to be used in the encryption and decryption 
process, hence the problem of key distribution is a vital 
issue, ie how do two communicating parties securely 
inform each other of what secret key to use in the 
encryption?  This is solved by key distribution 
protocols. 
 
  
In ICON 2000, Li et al. [5] presented weaknesses of 
Hwang and Ku [3] two reparable key distribution 
protocols and then proceeded to present improved 
versions of these two protocols. 
One thesis that we maintain is that security-
providing protocols, as is a key distribution protocol, 
should be designed carefully not only to withstand 
known attacks but also be robust against any future 
ones.  Otherwise, the purpose of the protocol, that of 
achieving security against attacks in the first place, is 
lost.  Yet in literature, many insecure protocols 
continue to be designed, and subsequently many more 
variants are proposed by tweaking the insecure 
protocols.  This tweak-and-break cycle goes on ad 
infinitum because insecure variants keep triggering 
tweaks that often result again in insecure variants; this 
latter should be discouraged.  To be precise, no more 
variants should be proposed by mere tweaks; rather 
they should be accompanied with rigorous security 
analysis within well defined security models. 
In this paper, we show that the weaknesses 
presented by Li et al. are trivial.  Further, we present 
several attacks on their two improved protocols, which 
for lack of better names we simply call as IKDP1 and 
IKDP2 respectively.  Our results show that these 
protocols are extremely insecure and should not be 
used at all; thus supporting our above thesis about 
tweak-and-break cycles. 
 
2. Previous Work  
 
In this section, we review previous work by Li et al., 
namely the weaknesses they mentioned of Hwang and 
Ku’s protocols, and their suggested improvements. 
2.1 Hwang and Ku’s Protocols 
 
Hwang and Ku’s [3] key distribution protocols are 
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1: A → B A, EMA 
2: B → A {EMA, SK}K_ab 
 
A and B denote the two communicating parties, 
while EMA denotes a certain event marker [1] 
generated by A and locally kept in synchronization at 
A.  SK denotes the secret session key generated by B 
for use in the secret-key encryption of messages.  Here, 
{x}K denotes the secret-key encryption of message x 
under control of the secret key, K. 
Meanwhile, their second key distribution protocol is: 
 
1: A → B A, EMA 
2: B → AS A, EMA, B, EMB  
3: AS → A {EMB, A, SK}MK_b, {EMA, B, SK}MK_a 
4: A → B {EMB, A, SK}MK_b 
 
MK_a and MK_b denote the master keys owned and 
known only by A and B respectively.  Note also that AS 
denotes the authentication key server trusted by both 
parties, hence he also knows what MK_a and MK_b 
are.   
 
2.2 Li et al.’s Improved Protocols 
 
Li et al.’s proposed improvement of the Hwang and 
Ku’s key distribution protocol, KDP1, is as follows: 
 
1: A → B A, {EMA}K_ab 
2: B → A {EMA, SK}K_ab 
 
From now on, we will call this improvement the 
IKDP1.  Note that the only difference between this 
“improvement” and the original KDP1 proposed by 
Hwang and Ku is that the EMA is encrypted.   
Meanwhile, Li et al.’s proposed improvement of 
Hwang and Ku’s second key distribution protocol, 
KDP2, is as follows: 
 
1: A → B {A, EMA}MK_a 
2: B → AS {A, EMA}MK_a , {B, EMB ⊕ RB}MK_b 
3: AS → A {EMB ⊕ RB, A, SK}MK_b, {EMA, B, 
SK}MK_a 
4: A → B {EMB ⊕ RB, A, SK}MK_b 
 
From now on, we will call this improvement the 
IKDP2.  Here, RB is the random number generated by 
B when he generates EMB. 
 
2.3 Remarks on Trivial Previous “Attacks” on 
Hwang and Ku’s Protocols 
 
Li et al. presented in [5] two “attacks” on the key 
distribution protocols proposed by Hwang and Ku [3]. 
Their first “attack”, which they call an 
eavesdropping or passive attack, observes that the 
plaintext value of the event marker, EMA is available in 
message 1, while its corresponding encrypted 
ciphertext value is available in message 2, assuming 
that encryption has been done in the cipher block 
chaining (CBC) mode [7, 9].  Therefore, they remarked 
that one could perform a dictionary attack (more 
popularly known as brute-force exhaustive key search) 
on the plaintext-ciphertext pair of EMA and {EMA}K_ab 
by guessing all possible values of K_ab and encrypting 
EMA to see if {EMA}K_ab is obtained. 
However, we remark that this is very trivial since it 
is well-known that any system using a secret key 
would be susceptible to such a dictionary attack.  In 
fact, dictionary attacks are not at all practical but are 
simply used as a benchmark to compare other more 
practical attacks on a system.  Therefore, Li et al.’s 
first “attack” is no attack at all. 
Li et al’s second “attack” bases on the same 
assumption that an attacker has to mount a dictionary 
attack that requires guessing all possible secret key 
values.  Again, this is trivial and not an attack at all. 
 
3  Attacks on the Improved Protocols 
We present in this section several attacks on Li et al.’s 
improved key distribution protocols. 
 
3.1 Attacks on First Improved Protocol IKDP1 
 
We consider the simplest type of attacks on 
protocols, namely replay attacks which work by 
simply replaying previous messages captured by an 
attacker, C, by merely eavesdropping on the 
communication channel. 
Our first such attack, a special type of replay attack 
known as the unknown key-share attack [2, 4, 8] is as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
α.1: A → B A, {EMA’}K_ab 
α.2: B → A {EMA’, SK’}K_ab 
 
β.1: CA → B A, {EMA’}K_ab 
β.2: B → CA {EMA’, SK*}K_ab 
5976
Authorized licensed use limited to: LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on December 16, 2009 at 04:48 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
 
Here, CA denotes the attacker, C impersonating $A$ 
while EMA’ and SK’ are the event marker and session 
key used in a previous protocol run.  α denotes a valid 
previous protocol run while β denotes a false protocol 
run initiated by the attacker.   
During a previous protocol run, the attacker, C has 
captured messages 1 and 2 being communicated 
between A and B.  Now, after any valid protocol run 
between A and B, denoted by α in this case, the 
attacker, C impersonates A and replays a previously 
captured message 1 as a supposedly new message β.1 
to B.  B notices nothing amiss since this was a valid 
message generated by A, except that it is already 
outdated!  B therefore responds with message β.2 to A, 
but this is intercepted by C. 
B now thinks that he shares a new session key, SK* 
with A when in fact A does not even know of this 
protocol run, β and still thinks that he shares the old 
key, SK with B.  This attack shows a total failure of the 
Li et al.’s first improved key distribution protocol. 
Our second attack is again an unknown key-share 
attack but interleaves two protocol runs.  Such attacks 
are sometimes also called interleaving attacks [10] or 
parallel-session attacks.  It works as follows: 
 
α.1: A → CB A, {EMA}K_ab 
β.1: CB → A B, {EMA}K_ab 
β.2: A → CB {EMA, SK}K_ab 
α.2: CB → A {EMA, SK}K_ab 
 
A desires to establish a new protocol run with B but 
this is intercepted by an attacker who impersonates B.  
This attacker is denoted as CB.  Then, CB in continuing 
to impersonate B, immediately initiates another new 
protocol run with A by simply replaying the {EMA}K_ab 
component of message α.1 to form β.1.  A is therefore 
led into thinking that as he is having the protocol run, 
α with B, B is starting another new protocol run, β with 
A.  Since message β.1 is supposed to be a message 
generated by B for A, it is B’s responsibility to check 
that the event marker contained within β.1 is in proper 
non-repeating order and thus A does not check it 
against his own record of previous event markers 
generated by A. 
A, in response to message β.1, replies with message 
β.2 containing the new session key, SK that he would 
share with B.  This is however received by CB instead 
since he is impersonating B.  Protocol run, β is now 
complete with A thinking he is sharing the key, SK 
with B when in fact B is not even involved.  Further, 
CB immediately replays message β.2 as its message α.2 
to A.  Upon receipt of this, A thinks that protocol run, α 
is also complete and that he shares another secret key, 
SK with B when again, B is not involved.  This attack 
shows a total failure of authentication of the IKDP1 
protocol since an attacker could by simple replaying of 
messages, lead a legitimate party, A into thinking he is 
communicating and establishing secret keys with 
another legitimate party, B when in fact he is doing so 
with an illegitimate party, C while B is not present at 
all!  It also shows how C could manipulate A as an 
oracle into generating valid messages from itself to 
itself, and have A believe that the messages are 
generated from another legitimate party. 
Our third attack is a type of replay attack known as 
the multiplicity attack [6].  It proceeds as follows: 
 
α.1: A → B A, {EMA}K_ab 
α.2: B → A {EMA, SK}K_ab 
 
β.1: CA → B A, {EMA}K_ab 
β.2: B → CA {EMA, SK}K_ab 
 
Protocol run α  is a normal previous run between 
legitimate parties A and B.  The attacker, C has 
eavesdropped on this protocol run, and immediately 
after it ends, impersonates A and replays message α.1 
as a new message β.1 to B.  Thinking that this is a new 
initiation message from A, B responds with message 
β.2. 
 Therefore, although A only meant to execute one 
protocol run with B, B thinks that A has executed two 
protocol runs with it.  Again, since the event marker is 
generated and sent by A, it is A’s responsibility to 
check it for correct order and so B does not detect 
anything amiss.  Multiplicity attacks are advantages in 
certain situations such as in banking applications where 
A and C could be account holders while B is the bank.  
A initiates one protocol run with B as a direction to B 
to transfer $1000 from A’s account to C’s account as a 
payment for something.  C mounts this attack and 
causes B to transfer $1000 for two times instead of 
once so C has cheated A of an extra $1000.  In fact, C 
could repeat this attack indefinitely and cause B to 
transfer the money as many times as C likes. 
 Our final attack is a denial of service (DoS) attack, 
as follows: 
 
α.1: CA → B A, {EMC}K_cx 
α.2: B → CA {EMy, SK}K_ab 
 
Here, C simply impersonates A by sending the message 
α.1 to B.  The encrypted component, {EMC}K_cx is 
generated by C and has been encrypted with the key 
K_Cx that C shares with any party, x.  Upon receipt of 
5987
Authorized licensed use limited to: LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on December 16, 2009 at 04:48 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
this, B tries to decrypt {EMC}K_cx using the key, K_ab 
that he shares with A.  However, since this key is 
different from the original key used by C, B will 
therefore obtain a value, EMy that is different from 
EMC .  Nevertheless, this does not matter since B does 
not check its validity because the event marker is 
supposed to be checked by the initiator, A.  Therefore, 
the protocol session successfully completes with B 
thinking he has executed a protocol run with A and 
now shares the secret key, SK with A.  However, A is 
not present at all in the protocol. 
Note that all our 4 attacks allow an attacker to cheat 
some legitimate party into thinking he is 
communicating with another legitimate party.  This 
itself is already a proof that the IKDP1 protocol fails to 
achieve the basic requirement of mutual authentication, 
that legitimate parties are guaranteed that they are 
communicating with other legitimate parties who are 
really who they claim to be. 
 
3.2 Attacks on Second Improved Protocol 
IKDP2 
 
Our first attack is a replay attack that works as follows: 
 
α.1: A → CB {A, EMA}MK_a 
α.2: CB → AS {A, EMA}MK_a, {B, EMB’ ⊕  RB’}MK_b 
α.3: AS → A {EMB’ ⊕ RB’, A, SK}MK_b ,  
{EMA, B, SK}MK_a 
α.4: A → CB {EMB’ ⊕ RB’, A, SK}MK_b 
 
When A tries to initiate a protocol run with B by 
sending it message α.1, C intercepts, leading A into 
thinking that he is B.  C then impersonates B again and 
replays message α.1 as the first component of message 
α.2 to AS.  The remaining component is obtained by 
replaying part of a previously captured message 2, 
namely {B, EMB’ ⊕ RB’}MK_b.  AS responds with 
message α.3 to A, who then forwards the first part of 
that as message α.4 to B, which is immediately 
intercepted by C. 
At the end of this protocol run, A thinks he shares a 
secret session key with B when in fact B is not be 
present at all.  This is a failure of the IKDP2 protocol 
and is a type of unknown key-share attack. 
Our second attack is also a replay attack that 
proceeds as follows: 
 
α.1: A → B {A, EMA’}MK_a 
α.2:B → A {A, EMA’}MK_a , {B, EMB’ ⊕ 
RB’}MK_b 
α.3:AS → A {EMB’ ⊕ RB’, A, SK’}MK_b, 
{EMA’, B, SK’}MK_a 
α.4:A → B {EMB’ ⊕ RB’, A, SK’}MK_b 
β.1:CB → A {B, EMB’  ⊕ RB’}MK_b 
β.2:A → AS {B, EMB ’ ⊕ RB’}MK_b, {A, EMA   
⊕ RA}MK_a 
β.3:AS → CB {EMA ⊕ RA, B, SK}MK_a , {EMB’, 
A, SK}MK_b 
β.4:CB → A {EMA ⊕ RA, B, SK}MK_a 
 
Here, α denotes a valid previous protocol run between 
A and B, while the values EMA’, EMB’ and SK’ denote 
the corresponding values in that previous protocol run.  
The attacker, C has eavesdropped on this 
communication.  C then impersonates B and replays 
the second component of message, α.2, namely {B, 
EMB’ ⊕ RB’}MK_b as part of a new message β.1 to A.  A, 
in thinking it is B trying to initiate a new protocol run 
with it, continues with the protocol by sending 
message β.2 to the authentication server, AS.  AS 
responds by sending the message β.3 to B but this is in 
fact received by C since he is impersonating B.  C then 
completes the protocol by forwarding the first 
component of message β.3 as message β.4 to A. 
At the end of this protocol, β, the party A thinks he 
now shares the new secret key, SK with B when in fact 
B was not involved at all in this protocol run.  To B, he 
still shares the secret key, SK’ with A.  This is also a 
type of unknown key-share attack. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks  
 
We have presented attacks on the two improved key 
distribution protocols, IKDP1 and IKDP2 proposed by 
Li et al. in [5].  Our attacks work because the designers 
of the IKDP1 and IKDP2 used event markers 
incorrectly.  Namely, the event markers are 
synchronized locally meaning that only the party which 
generated them would check to make sure they are 
used in the correct order and remain unique.  Other 
parties do not do this check and so as far as they are 
concerned, they would not be able to detect if such 
event markers are replayed and reused.  However, in 
the IKDP1 and IKDP2, the event marker is not sent 
back to the party which generated it for rechecking and 
maintaining local synchronization.  This is totally in 
contrast to the protocols in the paper [1] where event 
markers were first proposed. 
Therefore, we stress that when protocol designers 
wish to use a certain technique to achieve the 
corresponding security that it is supposed to provide, 
then they should consult the original paper where the 
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technique was proposed and thoroughly understand 
how that technique is to be used properly and correctly.  
Otherwise, it would fail to achieve the desired security 
objective. 
Further, the IKDP2 protocol also falls to our attacks 
because there is no requirement on the initiator of the 
protocol to take part in any challenge-response.  
Referring to the 4 messages communicated in IKDP2, 
the initiator is involved in sending the messages 1 and 
4.  Message 1 can be anything generated by A while 
message 4 is simply a forward of the first component 
of message 3.  Therefore, the initiator is not supposed 
to demonstrate his knowledge of any secret, which is 
common in challenge-response schemes for achieving 
mutual authentication of parties. 
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